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Anstaett: Anstaett: Is Settlement Conditioned on Vacatur an Option

COMMENT
IS SETTLEMENT CONDITIONED
ON VACATUR AN OPTION?
SHOULD IT BE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, whether a court grants or denies a motion to vacate resulting from
settlement depends more on the particular court in which the request is made, than
on the facts of the case and the effect of vacatur. Courts not permitting vacatur
have expressed the fear that parties sensing they are going to lose will "buy their
way out of an unfavorable precedent often at the relatively cheap price asked by
the single opponent they face in that appeal."1 Other courts routinely grant
requests for vacatur. Settlements conditioned on the court's granting vacatur, and
thereby avoiding precedent or issue preclusion, can be expected 2to increase as the
use of court-annexed mediation at the appellate level expands.
Conflicting views of litigation as a predominately public concern, as opposed
to a private concern, raise difficult issues for the mediator and the court in
evaluating settlements. Pending an appeal, can the parties fashion a settlement
under which the losing party offers the winning party something in return for a
joint motion to vacate the lower court judgment? This type of settlement involves
not only the parties, as in pre-trial settlement, but the court which must vacate the
judgment. The vacatur can also affect third parties not involved in the litigation
who may later want to use the judgment as precedent or for issue preclusion. In
light of this, how should the mediator respond when the idea of a settlement

1. Village Escrow v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 687, 696 (Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1988) (denying dismissal requested as a part of settlement agreement after oral argument but before
the judgment had been issued). See also In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299,
1303 (7th Cir. 1988); Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720,
721 (9th Cir. 1982).
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit started the Civil Appeals
Management Program (CAMP) in 1974; the Sixth Circuit started a mediation program in 1981; the
Ninth Circuit started its Innovation Project in 1983 to clarify issues on appeal; the D.C. Circuit has an
experimental settlement program; and the Tenth Circuit is about to begin a conference program, the
Tenth District Court of Appeals Pre-Hearing Conference Program, submitted to the Ohio Supreme
Court Committee on Dispute Resolution, Public Hearing Nov. 9, 1989. Appellate level mediation or
settlement programs are found in the state appellate courts of California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. SIXTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALs MARCH STATUS REPORT, April 5, 1990.
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conditioned on vacatur arises? Should the parties' interests take priority over the
public interests, and how should the court respond to such requests?
The reason that the parties request vacatur may vary and affect the
appropriateness of vacatur. If the parties want to vacate a poorly reasoned or
mistaken judgment in order to avoid the time and expense of an appeal, such a
settlement would seem to be efficient and create few policy concerns. However,
if the original judgment was sound and well-reasoned and the losing party is
willing to pay the winning party to obtain a joint motion to vacate in order to
avoid the preclusive effect of the judgment, then major policy concerns arise.
The courts have come to no consensus on the proper response to such
requests, or even the appropriate procedural steps. Some courts routinely vacate
at the request of the parties, 3 others deny such requests, 4 and others advocate a
balancing approach at the district court level.5 As a result of this uncertainty,
mediators may be reluctant to suggest vacatur as an alternative in appellate level
mediation. If vacatur is not appropriate, then this is not a problem; but if vacatur
is a legitimate alternative, then the mediator is ignoring a valuable tool in his
attempt to move the parties toward settlement.
This Comment will examine the procedures used to request vacatur, the effect
of vacatur on a judgment, and the courts' response to these requests. This
Comment will then look at the policy considerations and suggest that in deciding
whether to vacate a judgment a balancing of the factors involved is the most
appropriate treatment and suggest the factors to be considered by the court in this
balancing. This Comment will also consider policy considerations for the
mediator in appellate level mediation programs.
II. PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING VACATUR
A. Requesting Vacatur
Parties who reach settlement and want vacatur of a judgment often make a
rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure6
60(b), which governs federal courts in granting relief from judgments or orders,
permits the court to grant relief in a variety of situations including mistake,
neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, judgment is void, judgment has been
satisfied, or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." 7 The language of the rule indicates that the court is to use its

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2nd Cir. 1985).
See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299.
See Ringsby, 686 F.2d 720.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60. Rule intended to cover the whole field, 1946 advisory committee notes.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
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8
discretion in granting or denying the motion "upon such terms as are just".
According to the traditional rule, when the motion to vacate is made pending
appeal, the district court has been divested of jurisdiction and is without power to
grant relief under rule 60(b). 9 The district court needs the permission of the
appellate court to grant the11motion. 10 An order denying relief under rule 60(b)
is a final appealable order.
The circuits vary in whether or not they allow the motion to vacate to be
originally filed in the district court, require the case be remanded to the district
court to hear the motion, or decide to hear the motion themselves. For example,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the district court a rule 60(b)
motion requesting vacatur, leaving open the right to-appeal the district court's
decision. 12 The Ninth Circuit has denied a request for vacatur and dismissed the
appeal, indicating that the decision "between the competing values of finality of
judgment and the right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes should be left to the
district court." 13 In later cases, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court dismissing the appeal.' 4 Both the Second and the Ninth Circuit
courts in remanding indicated that on appeal the standard of review would be for
an abuse of discretion. 15 The Sixth Circuit follows the procedure of First
National Bank of Salem, Ohio v. Hirsch,16 which requires that a 60(b) motion,
after notice of appeal, be made to the district court and if the district court
indicates that it is disp osed to grant the motion, the appellate court should grant
a motion to remand.' The Seventh Circuit has denied motions to vacate made
directly to the appellate
court, alternatively allowing dismissal of the appeal "as
18
a matter of course."
The courts also vary in how they characterize the motion to vacate, not all
considering such a request as a rule 60(b) motion. The United States District

8. Id. See Lohman v. General Am. life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973); Justice Black's comment describing the discretion under 60(bX6):
In simple English, the language of the "other reason" clause, for all reasons except the
five particularly specified, vests power in the court adequate to enable them to vacate
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1849).
9. 7 J. MOORE & J. LAcks, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.30(2) at 331-32 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter J. MOORE].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 331 (1160.30(1)).
12. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281.
13. Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 722 (denying the request to vacate the lower court judgment).
14. Allard v. DeLorean, 884 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1989) (after dismissing the appeal, the court
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether to vacate the judgment below).
15. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafist Co., 891 F.2d at 765; Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282.
16. 535 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 346.
18. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying the motion without
explanation); Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1300 (denying the motion on the rationale that an opinion
is a public act of government).
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Court for the Western District of Virginia considered a joint motion to vacate a
appealed to
rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment, 19 which the parties
2°
the Fourth Circuit after the district court denied the motion.
Parties also rely on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Munsingwear2 1 to request vacatur when the parties have settled pending an
appeal. 22 In Munsingwear,the Court held that the appellate court should vacate
a lower court judgment where the issue has become moot, at the request of the
parties. 23 The case involved an issue which was rendered moot by an amendment to the law being challenged.24 The Court was concerned over the lack of
any review of the case in the Court of Appeals and the possibility of the judgment
parties from judgbeing used for res judicata . 5 The Court sought to protect
26
ments "review of which was prevented by happenstance."
The lack of a consistent response by the courts leaves parties and mediators
uncertain as to how the court will allow the issue of vacatur to come before it, and
once before the court, how it will use its discretion in deciding whether to grant
or deny the request. The most common procedure is to consider the motion a rule
60(b) motion for relief from judgment which should be remanded to the district
court, appealable to the appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard.27
What the district court should consider in granting or denying the motion and
therefore what constitutes an abuse of discretion is less clear.
B. The Issue of Mootness
1.

Mootness Requires Vacatur

The mootness doctrine28 often arises in discussions of whether to vacate a
lower court judgment requested as a result of settlement. Based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Munsingwear,29 it is argued that, once a live controversy no

19. Kennedy v. Block, 606 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Va. 1985).
20. Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986).
21. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
22. National Union, 891 F. 2d at 765 ("We assume that it [National Union Fire] relies upon
United States v. Munsingwear as the basis for its motion to vacate.").
23. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 38-39.
26. Id. at 40.
27. Cf Nestle, 756 F.2d 280; FirstNational Bank of Salem, 535 F.2d 343.
28. This doctrine is used to describe the idea that court must vacate a decision when the issue has
become moot and is unreviewable.
29. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36. The Munsingwear rule states that it is the duty of the appellate
court to vacate a judgment if requested by the parties when the appeal is to be dismissed as moot. 13A
C. WRIGiHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1984) § 3533.10
at 426 [hereinafter C. WRIGirT].
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longer exists, the issue is moot and must be vacated at the request of the
parties. 30 "It is the well settled doctrine that when a matter presented on appeal
ceases to embody a case or controversy, it is 'the duty of the31appellate court' to
dismiss the appeal and vacate the judgment appealed from."
The traditional rule relies on article III of the United States Constitution,
which requires that federal courts hear only cases or controversies. 32 The courts
recognize an exception for short-lived issues "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." 33 The Fourth Circuit in Kennedy v. Block 34 found that the "claims
now before us are moot as a result of settlement," and therefore vacated the lower
district court order.35 Similarly in Aviation Enterprises,Inc. v. Orr,36 the court
found there no longer existed a case or controversy due to the parties' settlement
and vacated the district court order as a matter of duty.3 7 Agreeing that "all of
the issues involved in the appeal had been rendered moot in view of the earlier
agreement between the parties settling the entire controversy," 38 the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found "that the appropriate action in
such case is to vacate the judgment previously rendered." 39
2. Settlement Does Not Result in Mootness
Not all courts agree that settlement renders an -action moot. The Seventh
Circuit has held that settlement does not render an action moot. 40 "[A] case
does not become moot because the parties have voluntarily abandoned their right
to further review." 41 The Ninth Circuit explained in In re Memorial Hospital
of Iowa County, Inc.,42 that in the court's view settlement was no different than

a choice not to pursue one's right to appeal.43 The court also indicated that in
the case before it, involving a bankruptcy proceeding, any settlement had to be

30. See Kennedy, 784 F.2d 1220; Aviation Enters., Inc. v. Orr, 716 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Swingline, Inc. v. I.B. Kleinert Rubber Co., 399 F.2d 283 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
31. Aviation Enters., 716 F.2d at 1407-08, relying on Munsingwear.
32. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
33. Kennedy, 784 F.2d at 1222, quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
34. Id. at 1220.
35. Id. at 1224.
36. 716 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 1407-08.
38. Swbigline, 399 F.2d at 284.
39. Id.
40. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 585 (giving no further explanation).
41. Id.; Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301.
42. 862 F.2d 1299.
43. Id. at 1301.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1991, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 7
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1991, No. 1

Some settlements are conditioned on the vacatur of the lower court judgment.
The Second Circuit in Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Market, Inc.45 found that
when the parties preserve their right to appeal should the judgment not be vacated,
the case is not moot.46 "[M]ootness would be the consequence of vacatur. We
conclude, therefore, the action is48not moot." 47 Commentators and other courts
have agreed with this reasoning.
3. Settlement Results in Mootness,
But Does Not Require Vacatur
Rather than focusing on whether the case has become moot and therefore
whether the court has any discretion in vacating the judgment, the Ninth Circuit
has distinguished the mootness in the Munsingwear line of cases requiring vacatur,
from mootness resulting from a voluntary settlement which does not require
vacatur. 49 The Ninth Circuit in Ringsby Trucking Line, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters5° found "relevant the distinction between litigants who are
responsible for rendering their cases moot and those who are not. 5 1 The court
was concerned that "[i]fthe effect of post-judgment settlements were automatically
a trial court's
to vacate the trial court's judgment, any litigant dissatisfied with
52
findings would be able to have them wiped from the books."
The Ninth Circuit found the rule in Munsingwearto be "equitable in nature,"
and not applicable to a voluntary decision not to pursue an appeal. 53 The court
relied on the Supreme Court's more recent opinion in Karcher v. May,54
indicating that mootness does not automatically require vacatur. In Karcher the
Supreme Court refused to vacate a judgment rendered moot when the parties who
appealed the judgment as officers of the legislature were not re-elected and the
newly-elected parties chose not to pursue the appeal.55 The Court explained its
refusal to vacate the lower court judgment and distinguished the case from
not become moot due to circumstances not
Munsingwear,stating "[t]his case did
56
attributable to any of the parties."

45. 756 F.2d 280.
46. Id. at 282.
47. Id.
48. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301; Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement
Conditioned upon Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L. J. 860, 876 (1987); Donovan & Yee,
Letting the Chips Fall: The Second Circuit's Decision on Toll House, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1029,
1031 (1986).
49. National Union, 891 F.2d 762; Allard, 884 F.2d 464; Ringsby, 686 F.2d 720.
50. 686 F.2d 720 (involving a challenge to the legality of a strike and an arbitration decision).
51. Allard, 884 F.2d at 467, relying on Ringsby, 686 F.2d 720.
52. Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721.
53. National Union, 891 F.2d at 767.
54. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
55. Id. at 83.
56. Id. at 82.
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The decision whether or not to vacate has also been characterized as
depending on whether the request to vacate was the result of bilateral or unilateral
action of the party. The distinction first arose in Cover v. Schwartz,57 where the
controversy was rendered moot by the action of the plaintiff pending appeal. The
court dismissed the appeal but refused to vacate the lower court order. 58 This
was later distinguished from the Munsingwear line of cases requiring vacatur
because the action causing mootness in Cover was the unilateral act of the
party. 59 The refusal to vacate was also explained as protecting the defendant
who had fairly won the protection of the courts, from being deprived of such
protection by the unilateral action of the other party. 6° , However, the Ninth
Circuit in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafist, Inc.,6 1 rejected the
bilateral/unilateral distinction, stating that allowing vacatur only if the request was
the result of bilateral action does not address
the Ringsby concerns, including third
62
party interests and finality of judgment.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Karcher63 , leaves open the possibility that
even if the issue has become moot, the court is not required to vacate the
judgment if the lack of review is due to the action of the parties, whether bilateral
or unilateral action. 64 The Ninth Circuit indicates that the decision whether to
vacate should be made by balancing the competing
interests involved and that this
6
balancing should be done by the district court.
C. Effect of Vacatur on Judgment
1. Issue Preclusion
A judgment can be used by or against a party in a later action through issue
preclusion,66 which prevents relitigation of issues fairly and fully litigated in a
previous case by a court of competent jurisdiction.67 The requirement of
mutuality in the defensive use of issue preclusion, when a defendant seeks to
prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim against the defendant which was
previously litigated and lost against a different defendant, 68 was abandoned when
the Supreme Court allowed a defendant not a party to the previous action to use

57. 133 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1943).
58. Id. at 547.
59. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283.
60. Id.
61. 891 F.2d 762.
62. Id. at 767.
63. 484 U.S. 72.
64. National Union, 891 F.2d at 767.
65. Id. (reaffirming "the strength and merits of Ringsby").
66. Issue preclusion is also referred to as collateral estoppel.
67. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979), quoted in Harris Trust & Say. v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 722 F. Supp. 998, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
68. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
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issue preclusion against the plaintiff in the previous case. 69 The mutuality
requirement in the offensive use of issue preclusion, when a plaintiff seeks to
prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue which the defendant unsuccessfully
litigated against another party, 70 was put on a similar level when the Court
allowed issue preclusion to be used by a plaintiff not a party to the previous suit
at the discretion of the trial court, taking into consideration a number of
factors.71 With the requirement of mutuality abandoned, the possible preclusive
effect of a judgment has an increasingly important role in a party's strategy during
settlement negotiations. The ability to use a judgment preclusively also gives a
judgment importance to third parties not a party to the suit who may later litigate
a similar issue.
Can final judgments which have been vacated as a result of settlement be
used preclusively? Generally, vacated judgments cannot be used for the basis of
issue preclusion. 72 It has been explained that judgments vacated for mootness
pending appeal lose their preclusive effect since the losing party has been
73
prevented from obtaining review, based on the decision in Munsingwear.
However, in settlement the party has not been denied the right of appellate review,
but has chosen not to pursue that right. In cases where the parties condition their
settlement on vacatur, the case is clearly not moot since the parties indicate that
they will continue their appeal if the vacatur is denied.74 Arguably preclusion
should apply to vacated judgments when the party has not been denied the right
to pursue its appeal, but voluntarily chosen not to pursue the appeal as part of a
settlement agreement.
Nevertheless, courts and parties appear to assume that judgments vacated as
a result of a settlement will not be given preclusive effect.75 In Nestle,7 6 the
Second Circuit in explaining Nestle's desire to avoid issue preclusion made no
indication that this would not be achieved by vacatur. The court stated, "Nestle
insists on vacatur of the court's judgment as a condition of settlement so that the
judgment will not automatically prevent it through the operation of collateral
estoppel from enforcing the trademark in the future." 77 The Nestle court went
on to explain its decision to vacate the judgment as honoring the importance of
settlement over the finality of the district court judgment. 78 The Ninth Circuit
in deciding not to allow vacatur in Ringsby,79 indicated that vacatur as a result

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of I11.
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
Id.
J. MOORE, supra note 9, at 1 0.416[2].
C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 3533.10 at 425.
Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281.
"[U]ncertain status of any preclusive effect," National Union, 891 F.2d at 769.
756 F.2d 280.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 283.
686 F.2d 720.
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of settlement would allow "any litigant dissatisfied with a trial court's findings.
. . to have them wiped from the 'books." 80 The Seventh Circuit, in In re
Memorial Hospital,8 1 cited third parties and "preclusive benefits" as a rationale
behind the court's refusal to vacate at the request of the parties after settlement,
82
indicating that such benefits would be lost if the judgment were vacated.
Commentators have also expressed the opinion that
judgments vacated as a result
83
of settlement should not have preclusive effect.
A federal district court faced a preclusion issue in HarrisTrust & Saving v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance.84 The plaintiff wanted to use against the
defendant insurance company a prior judgment resulting from a contract similar
to the one disputed in the instant case. The prior judgment had been vacated
pursuant to settlement after the district court judgment was released. The court
indicated that "under ordinary circumstances claim preclusion here would not be
'unfair', and the 'contemporary law of collateral estoppel [should] lead inescapably
to the conclusion that [Hancock] is collaterally estopped from relitigating the
question."' 85 The court stated it was bound by the Second Circuit's opinion in
Nestle which "suggests that litigants prepared to settle may contract with impunity
over the preclusive effects of their dispute."86 Therefore, the vacated
judgment
87
did not preclude relitigation of the same issue by John Hancock.
2. Precedent
Judgments are also valuable to third parties for their use as precedent.
District court opinions have persuasive force as precedent.8 The effect of
vacatur is unclear since the court has discretion in the effect given such precedent.
However, as the Seventh Circuit states in In re MemorialHospital,vacatur "clouds
and diminishes the si nificance of the holding." 89 While precedent is a
byproduct of litigation, it is valuable in that it saves judges and litigants time
in future cases. 9 1 There is also the possibility that judgments which would

80. Id. at 721.
81. 862 F.2d 1299.
82. Id. at 1302.
83. Zeller, supra note 48, arguing that the decision by the court whethcr to vacate should be based
on the probability that the judgment would be used in the future for preclusion, and distinguishing
between future offensive use and defensive use; Note, CollateralEstoppelEffects ofJudgments Vacated
Pursuantto Settlement, 1987 U. ILL.L REv. 731, 739 (arguing for denying preclusive effect as a way
to promote another settlement option--settlement conditioned on vacatur).
84. 722 F. Supp. 998.
85. Id. at 1009, quoting Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331.
86. id. at 1011.
87. Id.
88. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1987).
89. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
90. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
91. Id.
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otherwise be published if not vacated prior to publication will not be published,
making the judgment unavailable to most third parties. Non-litigants also use
judgments to guide and shape behavior and make decisions. 92 The ability of
judgments to be used by third parties through issue preclusion, as precedent, and
for guidance, expands the effect of vacatur beyond the parties to the settlement.
III. COURTS' RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR VACATUR
The courts which have dealt with the issue of whether to vacate a judgment
at the request of the parties as a part of a settlement agreement, have responded
differently to the discretion allowed by rule 60(b). These differences rest largely
on the importance the court places on the competing values of finality of judgment
and judicial economy versus preference for settlement and party autonomy. This
section will examine the different approaches the courts use in deciding whether
to grant or deny vacatur requested as a result of settlement.
A. Preferencefor Settlement
In Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester'sMarket, Inc.,9 3 Nestle brought a suit against
Saccon for trademark infringement. The district court granted Saccon partial
summary judgment, holding that the term "toll house" was generic and could not
be a trademark. 94 Nestle appealed and while the appeal was pending, the parties
reached a settlement through the Second Circuit's settlement program with the
assistance of staff counsel. 95 The case was remanded to the district court to
consider the motion to vacate, after the appellate court indicated that this was the
proper procedure, and the district court denied the motion. 96 The parties then
moved the appellate court to vacate the judgment, which the court treated as an
appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate. The Second Circuit reviewed the
district court's denial under an abuse of discretion standard, pursuant to rule 60(b).
The appellate court found that the lower court had abused its discretion by
the case with instructions to vacate the order and
refusing to vacate and remanded
97
dismiss the complaint.

92. Brunet, Measuring the Cost of Civil Justice, 83 MICH. L. REV. 916, 933 (1985).
93. 571 F. Supp. 763.
94. Id. at 769.
95. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281. The Second Circuit started a settlement program in 1974 called Civil
Appeals Management Plan (CAMP). Under the program cases deemed likely to settle are scheduled
for pre-argument conferences with staff counsel. The conferences are mandatory and seek to clarify
the issues, clear up procedural problems, and discuss settlement. Address by Dominic King, Judicial
Conference-Federal Circuit Settlement, 108 F.R.D. 494, 496 (1986) [hereinafter King].
96. Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Conn. 1984).
97. Nestle, 756 F.2d 280. It has been suggested that the Second Circuit's involvement in the
settlement through its CAMP program influenced its decision to enforce the settlement. Zeller, supra
note 48, at 861-62.
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In refusing to vacate, the district court in Nestle cited the importance of
finality of judgment and the public interest. 98 The Second Circuit believed that
these goals were best served by vacating the district court judgment. Reasoning
that the policies favoring finality ofjudgment are intended to conserve judicial and
private resources, vacating the judgment would bring an end to the litigation and
therefore save both private and public resources.99 Since the settlement was
conditioned on vacatur, if the judgment was not vacated Nestle intended to pursue
its right to appeal, 1°° leading to more litigation and more expense for both the
parties and the court.
The .Second Circuit also cited the strong preference for settlement, a
preference which outweighs the interest in finality of judgment.10 1 The court
cited Supreme Court cases vacating judgments, such as Munsingwear,to illustrate
that the interest in finality of judgment often yields to other concerns. The court
also cited cases where vacatur was permitted in cases settled on appeal and
commentators who support such a position. 10 2 Finally, the court saw no
rationale for forcing parties who would prefer
to settle to continue litigation
10 3
because of future "hypothetical" defendants.
The Second Circuit views litigation as a predominately private concern,
placing emphasis on the parties' desire to end the dispute. The court is also more
interested in the public benefit of ending litigation and conserving judicial
10 4
resources, than any possible loss to the public from vacating the judgment.
B. Refusing Vacatur PendingAppeal
The Seventh Circuit has indicated that it will always refuse motions to vacate
a district court's judgment based on settlement. The court explained this position
in In re Memorial Hospital.10 5 It stated that, "[wie always deny these motions
to the extent they ask us to annul the district court's acts, on the ground that an
opinion is a public act of the government, which may not be expunged by private
agreement."' 0 6 The court acknowledged the benefits of settlement, but indicated that if parties want to avoid issue preclusion they need to reach a settlement
prior to the district court rendering a decision. 10 7 The court opined that when
settlement goes beyond a compromise by the parties and involves judicial action,

98. Nestle, 596 F. Supp. 1445.
99. Id. at 1452-53.
100. Id. at 1446.
101. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282.
102. Id. at 283, citing C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, at § 3533.10 at 432; Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); Aviation Enters., 716 F.2d
1403.
103. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
104. See id. at 282.
105. 862 F.2d 1299.
106. Id. at 1300.
107. Id. at 1302.
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such as in a motion to vacate, more than the parties' interests become involved
and the court must look beyond the desire of the parties. The court identified
third party interests in the judgment for its preclusive and precedent value, and the
court's interest in maintaining its authority, as other interests deserving consideration. 1 8 Seeing the act of vacating final judgments as eroding the authority of
the court, Judge Easterbrook wrote:
The interest of litigants in general, however, lie with the orderly
operation of a system of justice, one in which the conclusions of
litigation are recorded and thus preserved for the future, one in which
slightly higher costs in today's case10may
reduce the trouble encountered
9
by litigants and judges tomorrow.
The court0 then went on to grant the motion to dismiss the appeal as a matter of
11
course.
The Seventh Circuit clearly falls on the side of viewing litigation as a public
concern.1 11 This is in line with the writing of Owen Fiss,1 12 who is against
settlement. He views litigation as a public process, paid for at public expense, to
enforce and shape legal norms. 113 Since judgments are a public resource,
private parties cannot make them disappear as a result of an agreement between
114
themselves.
C. Balancing Factors Involved in Vacatur
The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the competing interests of finality of
judgment and the right to relitigate unreviewed disputes should be left to the
district court. 115 The Ninth Circuit in Ringsby, 116 finding vacatur requested
as a result of settlement distinguishable from a request for vacatur in the
Munsingwear line of cases, denied the motion to vacate and dismissed the appeal
as moot. 117 In denying the motion, the court indicated that the district court
was the proper place to explore the competing interests, but cautioned that losing

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1303.
110. Id.
111. See generally id.
112. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). Citing imbalances of power, disparity
of resources, settlements contrary to justice, and the structural reform and enforcement role of the
judicial process, Fiss argues against settlement.
113. Id. at 1085.
114. Id.
115. Rungsby, 686 F.2d 720, 722, quoted in Allard, 884 F.2d at 467.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 723.
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they dislike by paying the winning
parties should not be able to erase judgments
118
party to agree to a joint motion to vacate.
The Ninth Circuit reiterated its position in Allard v. DeLorean.1 19 In that
case, the court dismissed an appeal as moot and remanded the case to the district
court to decide the issue of vacatur. 120 The dispute was rendered moot by a
settlement between Allard and DeLorean, entered in the Michigan bankruptcy
court where DeLorean had filed for bankruptcy. In remanding, the Ninth Circuit
instructed the district court to balance the competing interests of the parties,
of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of
namely "the competing12values
1
unreviewed disputes."
The Ninth Circuit reviewed for an abuse of discretion of this balancing in
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp.122 The district court had refused
to vacate its decision in an insurance contract dispute after the parties requested
vacatur as a result of settlement reached while the appeal was pending.'12 The
parties appealed this denial. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit responded to
criticism of the Ringsby balancing process, 124 saying that vacatur is not required
125
by Munsingwear as illustrated by the Supreme Court decision in Karcher.
The court acknowledged that refusal to vacate may increase the cost of settlement
but stated that "[t]his cost is not so high that it should defeat (1) the public interest
in maintaining judicial finality, and (2) the legitimate interest of others in potential
to affirm the district court's
nonmutual preclusion." 126 The court went on 127
interests.
party
third
the
given
vacatur,
of
refusal
Although the Ninth Circuit clearly places the discretion with the district
court, 128 it is less clear what factors the district court should consider. The
National Union court notes the importance of settlement, finality of judgment, and
third party interests, and indicates that the equities and hardships of each case
must be considered.129
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATION
A court's decision in applying its discretion to grant or deny vacatur
requested as a result of settlement is based largely on which interests the court

118. Id. at 721.
119. 884 F.2d 464.
120. Id. at 465.
121. Id. at 467, citing Ringsby, 686 F.2d. at 722.
122. 891 F.2d 762.
123. Id. at 764.
124. Nestle, 756 F.2d 280; C. WRIGur, supra note 28, at § 3533.10 at 431-32.
125. National Union, 891 F.2d at 766, citing Karcher, 484 U.S. at 108. See supra notes 56-57
and accompanying text.
126. National Union, 891 F.2d at 768.
127. Id. at 769.
128. Id. at 767.
129. Id. at 768.
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finds most compelling. 130 Courts granting vacatur cite party autonomy and a
preference for settlement-private concerns. 131 Courts denying vacatur cite
finality of judgment and third party interests-public concerns. 132 Underlying
issues, such as whether a party is seeking vacatur to avoid preclusion versus
seeking vacatur to save time and avoid appealing a bad decision, also deserve
consideration. 133 This section will explore the various factors the court should
consider in applying its discretion and the policy questions associated with these
factors.
A. Factors Favoring Vacatur
Factors cited for vacating a lower court judgment at the request of the parties
as a result of settlement are party
autonomy, preference for settlement and
134
conservation of private resources.
1. Party Autonomy
The concern for party autonomy comes from the fact that litigation is partyinitiated and party-controlled. 135 In recognition of party autonomy, the courts
permit dismissal as of right even when they refuse to vacate. 1 36 If litigation is
a purely private dispute resolution process, it would follow that a settlement
agreed to by the parties deserves judicial respect. 137 If the parties agree to a
settlement which includes a joint motion to vacate, then the winning party must
believe it is as well compensated as it would be by the winning judgment. The
parties presumably protect their own best interests in agreeing to settlement, which
the court overrides when it denies vacatur as requested by the parties.
Accepting the fact that litigation involves third parties and the judicial
system, there are strong arguments against forcing parties to choose between
continuing an appeal which they would prefer to settle or letting a lower court
judgment which they disagree with remain in force. Parties to a suit should not
have to bear the cost and risk of further litigation because of concern for third
parties. 138 To require such parties to continue litigation is favoring the court's
disposition of the case over the parties and favoring non-parties over the present
parties.' 39 Continuing an appeal which the parties would rather settle also

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Zeller, supra note 48, at 865.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 867-68.
Id. 'at 869.
Id. at 866.
Resknik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL REV. 837, 845-49 (1984).
Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303; Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 723.
Zeller, supra note 48, at 866.
Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
Note, supra note 82, at 748.
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forces the
winning party to wait for payment pending the outcome of the
140
appeal.
2. Preference for Settlement
Preference for settlement is often cited as the basis for granting vacatur
conditioned on settlement. 14 1 Settlement has many benefits for the parties, the
courts and the public. Settlement resolves uncertainties, restores relations, limits
court costs, saves time, frees the parties for more productive activities, and frees
the courts for cases requiring more attention. 142 Settlement is highly favored
because it conserves judicial resources and concludes litigation. The Second
Circuit in Nestle cites commentators who argue that parties should be able to settle
on conditions which meet their needs because of the important policies that are
promoted by voluntary settlement. 143 "Parties should remain free to settle on
entry of a new consent decree, or
terms that require vacation of the judgment,
144
needs."
their
fits
as
action
other
such
Settlement is also favored because it can provide resolutions which are not
available to the parties through litigation, such as compromise and other solutions
not involving fault. 145 This can be particularly beneficial to parties who will
have an ongoing relationship after the resolution of the dispute, whether they are
members of a family or corporations with a beneficial business relationship.
Settlement allows the parties to shape a solution which meets both their needs, and
may also be less disruptive to third parties than litigation, such as in child custody
cases.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1983 to specifically
include settlement negotiations as a purpose of pretrial conferences set by the
court. 146 The advisory notes explain the benefits of settlement, stating
"settlement obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the
litigants and the judicial system."'147 The Federal Rules of Evidence also
address settlement in rule 408 which provides special protection to settlement

140. Id. at 752.
141. Cf Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Products Group, 819 F.2d 277, 299 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
Nestle. 756 F.2d at 283.
142. Zeller, supra note 48, at 867; Kessler & Finklestein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door
Courthouse, 37 CATH. U.L REV. 577, 578 (1988).
143. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283, citing C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, at § 3533.10 at 432.
144. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283.
145. Menkel-Meadow, For andAgainst Settlement: Uses andAbuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L REv. 485, 509-11 (1985) (discussing settlement solutions which meet the
needs of parties better than litigation).
146. Purpose of the conference may be "facilitating the settlement of the case", FED. R. Civ. P.
16(a)(5); parties may consider at the conference "the possibility of settlement," id. at 16(cX7).
147. Id., advisory committee's note, 1983 amendment.
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negotiations. The advisory committee notes explain that the rule is 148
consistent with
"public policy favoring compromise and settlement of disputes."
3. Conservation of Resources
Settlement conditioned on vacatur may promote conservation of private and
public resources and reduce the time and expense of litigation. Not only do
parties have the right to decide whether to bring a valid claim, they also decide
whether to pursue their right to appeal. It is not unusual for cases to settle prior
to being heard by the appellate court. A Judicial Center study indicates that only
50% of cases appealed are argued. 149 These decisions are not based purely on
who has the correct legal position, but on the time and cost involved in litigation,
the public perception of such litigation, the benefit to be expected from winning,
and other factors. 150 When a party chooses to settle, she knows exactly what
the outcome is, which is of value in itself. Parties are also able to devise flexible
settlements which may go beyond the power of the court but are of benefit to both
parties, possibly more beneficial than a judgment.
The parties' decision to seek vacatur as a part of settlement may be based on
a belief that the lower court judgment was mistaken or based on multiple and
uncertain grounds. The parties may believe the outcome would be different on
appeal, but are willing to settle to save time and money. Such a settlement
promotes the public interest in efficiency. 151 The first judgment may have been
sound and well-reasoned, but the settlement offer made to the winning party, often
money, is more valuable than winning the case. While the latter situation raises
more concerns, it is still true that the parties have chosen the efficient outcome for
themselves.
Settlement conditioned on vacatur may also advance more public concerns
when it results in dismissing an appeal and bringing litigation to an end. 152 If
the parties agree to forego their right to appeal based on a settlement conditioned
on vacatur of the lower court order, then the court resources involved in a lengthy
appeal are saved. The court has indicated that the interest in finality of judgment
will sometimes yield to other concerns, such as when a decision has become
unreviewable pending an appeal through "happenstance" and should be vacated. 153 The interest in finality of judgment may also yield to judicial economy
and party autonomy concerns.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

FED. R. EVID. 408, advisory committee's note.
King, supra note 95, at 496.
N. RoGERs & R. SALEM, A STUDENT GUIDE To MEDIATION & IIE LAW 44-51 (1987).
Zeller, supra note 48, at 869.
Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282.
Id., citing Ringsby, 686 F.2d 720.
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B. FactorsDisfavoring Vacatur

As discussed below, factors cited by those opposed to vacatur requested as
a result of settlement include the interest in finality of judgment, efficient
allocation of resources, judicial economy, consistency, public respect for courts,
and third party interests.
1.

Finality of Judgment

Many of the concerns associated with vacatur are a part of the reasoning
behind the interest in finality of judgment. "Both the judicial system and the
public have a strong interest in the finality of judgments. The doctrines supporting
judgment finality-including res judicata and collateral estoppel-prevent needless
and endless relitigation of issues and claims." 154 Issue preclusion saves judicial
resources and increases efficiency by allowing courts to rely on decisions already
determined, avoiding relitigation of repetitive issues and allowing courts to
concentrate on new issues.
Issue preclusion also promotes consistency which in turn leads to public
respect for courts and legitimatizes the legal system.1 55 The orderly process of
justice relies on respect for the legal system and the judgments courts produce.1 56 If a judgment is considered a bargaining tool, only raising the price
of settlement for the losing party, then courts are not serving their purpose and the
laws they seek to enforce are undermined. Presenting the public policy arguments
against vacatur requested as a part of settlement, Zeller states in his article
discussing vacatur:
Settlement conditioned on vacatur... decreases public respect for the
legal establishment by encouraging wealthy litigants to sue until
reaching favorable outcomes, to conspire against interests of unrepresented future litigants, and to utilize public resources and then discard
the results ....
In so doing, settlement conditioned on vacatur allows
the present parties to appropriate from unrepresented third parties a
57
portion of the value of public adjudication.
Zeller goes on to advocate that vacatur be prohibited when requested to free a
plaintiff from the possible preclusive effect of a judgment. He argues that
allowing vacatur in this situation would encourage plaintiffs to sue defendants 1one
58
at a time and then buy off defendants when the outcome was not favorable.

154. Nestle, 596 F. Supp at 1451.
155. Zeller, supra note 48, at 867.
156. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303.
157. Zeller, supra note 48, at 868.
158. Id.
875.
Published
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The interest in finality of judgment can also promote judicial economy. The
time a court spends analyzing the issues and preparing a judgment, as well as the
parties' time preparing and arguing their case, is wasted when the decision is later
vacated.
2. Third Party Interests
Judgments are used as precedent and for guidance, giving the public an
interest in litigation. Since courts are public entities, these third party interests
play a valid role in a court's decision whether to allow vacatur or not. Collateral
estoppel not only conserves judicial resources, but also those of future litigants.1 59 However, often the third parties who will be affected are only
speculative and not easily identifiable. Should the courts be concerned with
looking out for these unrepresented third parties, who receive no benefit from the
settlement, but who could rely on the judgment in the future but for the vacatur?
Requiring the court to consider third parties not presently before it is not a new
role for the court. Courts consider outside interests in approving
settlement of
160
class actions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e).
A case not involving vacatur, but dismissal, relied on the interests of third
parties and judicial economy to deny the parties' request. Village Escrow, Inc. v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co., 161 arose in the California State Court of
Appeal and involved a breach of contract dispute. The parties reached a
settlement after oral arguments but prior to the court's reaching a decision. The
parties conditioned their settlement on the court's dismissing the appeal without
issuing an opinion. The court, noting that it favored early settlement, refused the
motion to dismiss. The California Rules of Court specifically give the court
discretion whether to honor a settlement which depends on dismissal of an
appeal.' 62 The court indicated that the contract issue before it was an issue of
first impression which, quoting respondent's counsel, "is of great interest to the
insurance industry."' 63 The court also noted the investment it had made in
hearing the case, making it no longer an issue solely of interest to the parties. The
court was concerned with the message such a settlement would send to the public
and future litigants, since the offer to settle was accompanied by a "substantial
sum of money" to the anticipated winning party. The court expressed concern that
such cases would continue to be settled prior to reaching the appellate level,
making an appellate level decision of particular importance. 1
For these
reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss and filed its opinion.

159. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
160. FED. R. Civ. P.; see Donovan & Yee, supra note 47, at 1033. For a further discussion of
rule 16, see McKay, Rule 16 andAlternativeDispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L REV. 818 (1988).
161. 248 Cal. Rptr. 687,
162. Id. at 695, citing Ca. Rules of Ct. 19(b).
163. Id. at 693.
164. Id. at 696.
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3. Courts as a Public Resource

Many of the concerns cited by those opposed to vacatur conditioned on
settlement are based on a view of litigation as a public resource. Owen Fiss, in
his articles opposing settlement, describes litigation through a "structural reform"
model. 165 Under this model, litigation proceeds within the framework of the
Constitution which embodies public values which are given concrete meaning
within the context of government through court decisions. 166 The courts
safeguard public values and enforce norms through the use of public resources
directed by public officials. He cites Brown v. Board of Education1 67 and the
168
decision's effect as an example of structural reform achieved by litigation.
He argues that settlement should not be encouraged by the courts as it dilutes their
guidance and enforcement roles. 169 Other commentators agree, stating that
courts are financed with public money and that the "benefits of litigation are
and, accordingly, are at least partially external to individual
largely for society
170
adjudication."
If the courts do not encourage settlement, it follows that a court should not
grant the parties' request to vacate a judgment as a condition of settlement. For
example,-if a wealthy employer can pay a winning plaintiff in a discrimination suit
in return for a joint motion to vacate the judgment as a part of settlement, other
employers engaged in similar activities will not be alerted that their activity is
illegal. Future plaintiffs or possible plaintiffs will be deprived of the benefit of
the judgment in the previous case. This could affect their decision to protest the
firing or bring a suit. The vacatur would eliminate the societal benefit of the
judgment produced by the public court system. Additionally, this same pattern
could be repeated over and over again by employers, decreasing the likelihood of
the issue ever reaching the appellate level.
Judge Easterbrook espoused this view of litigation as a public resource in In
re Memorial Hospital.171 He stated that an opinion is a public act of government which private parties can not have vacated as the result of a private
agreement between them. Since vacatur involves a court action that effectively
erases a public act which would otherwise be available to third parties, such an act
requires close scrutiny by the court-scrutiny which includes consideration of
future litigants and the public. Easterbrook expressed concern for the loss of

165. Fiss, supra note 111, at 1087; Fiss, The Social and Political FoundationofAdjudication, 6
LAw HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982).
166. Fiss, supra note 111, at 1087-89.
167. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. Fiss, supra note 111, at 1089.
169. Id
170. Brunet, QuestioningADR Quality, 62 TUL. L REV. 1, 51 (1987); Brunet, supra note 88. See
also Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema? 99 HARV. L REV. 668 (1986)
(expressing concern over the use of alternative dispute resolution in certain types of cases and without
court oversight).
171. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
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expense, and then used as a "bargaining chip in the
precedent, created at public
172
settlement."
of
process
C. Balancing the Factors
Based on the various factors involved and the types of situations in which the
request for vacatur can arise, an all-or-nothing rule would not be appropriate.
Valid public policy issues raised by those who view litigation as a public process
and judgments as a public resource, fail to address'the interests of the parties
forced to litigate a dispute they would rather settle. Clearly there are cases when
vacatur is the most efficient for all concerned, including the courts and the public.
The decision whether to vacate and the strength of public policy concerns varies
depending on the soundness of the judgment and the likelihood that a different
result would be reached on appeal. Vacating a poorly reasoned or mistaken
judgment poses few problems and in fact is probably more efficient than pursing
an appeal which would result in a reversal of the lower court order. On the other
hand, if the case is well-reasoned and involves an important public issue or one
likely to continue to arise, then public resources are wasted by vacating the lower
court order and not pursing the appeal. A close decision, later vacated as a result
of a settlement fairly negotiated, will not raise the same policy concerns as a
vacatur which appears to be the result of the losing party paying off the winning
party.
This Comment, therefore, advocates the position followed by the Ninth
Circuit in balancing the competing interests as they arise in a particular case.
While this will give parties and mediators less certainty in knowing how a
particular court will respond to a request, given the importance of the concerns at
issue such a solution is best able to address the issues as they arise. As the
mediator deals with individualcases, he will be able to use a similar analysis to
the one suggested for district courts in deciding which cases would be appropriate
for suggesting or encouraging settlement involving vacatur. As the factors to
consider become more defined, parties and mediators will be better able to predict
how the court will respond to a request for vacatur and structure their settlement
accordingly.
The courts have looked at a variety of factors when deciding whether to grant
or deny a motion to vacate at the request of the parties and commentators have
suggested additional factors to consider. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the
district court should balance the competing interests of finality of judgment with
the right to relitigate unreviewed disputes.173 However, the court has not
specified how to balance these interests except to say that third party interests are
enough to justify a refusal to vacate.

172. Id. at 1302.
173. Allard, 884 F.2d at 467, quoting Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 722.
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Commentators discussing the Nestle decision have advocated a balancing test
rather than the Nestle rule favoring settlement. 174 They cite three factors: (1)
correct legal standard, (2) interest of the parties and those similarly situated (third
parties), and (3) policy considerations. 17 5 The commentators note that no one
factor is paramount but any one could be dispositive. 176 They go on to find
177
that the Nestle court used faulty reasoning to find that vacatur was justified,
while never clearly explaining the scope of the other two factors.
Zeller, in his article, advocates using a discretionary standard when the
parties seek vacatur to protect the defendant from future litigation because such
vacatur does not promote unfairness (unfairness promoted by the use of vacatur
to protect plaintiffs, which he argues should be prohibited). 178 Zeller believes
that factors which would be considered if preclusion were at issue should be
considered in deciding whether to vacate. These factors include inconsistency,
ambivalent decision, alternative basis for holding, incentive to fully litigate,
whether preclusive effect is allowed by substantive law, good faith, and the cost
179
of relitigation.
The factors used by the courts and commentators can be broken into four
categories: (1) the interests of the parties in control of litigation and costs, (2) the
interests of the courts in an orderly and efficient judicial system, (3) the interests
of third parties affected by the vacatur, and (4) the interests of the general public
arising from the judgment and the strength of the legal reasoning. The interests
of the parties focus on private concerns, while the three other categories focus on
more public concerns. These factors are often interrelated and may overlap
depending on the particular facts of the case.
The parties' interests will, of course, favor vacating the judgment. The
importance of permitting vacatur at the parties' request will involve an examination of the parties' situation, including their resources, whether litigation can
resolve their dispute as appropriately as settlement, and whether they are likely to
agree to a settlement on other terms if the vacatur is not permitted. The parties'
interests will also involve the burden of continuing litigation, including time,
expense and uncertainty if vacatur is denied. Less obvious party concerns which
may be relevant include imbalance of resources and power which may force a
party to agree to a settlement.
The court's interests focus on finality of judgment and respect for the judicial
system. Judicial economy in terms of the court's time and expense involved in
deciding the case originally and the likelihood the issue will arise again should

174. Donovan & Yee, supra note 47, at 1034.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1034.
177. Id. at 1037.
178. Zeller, supra note 48, at 876. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text, advocating
vacatur be prohibited when sought to protect the plaintiff.
179. Id. at 877.
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also be considered. The court will be concerned with the orderly and efficient
process of justice, which may depend on the presence of third party interests.
Third party interests involve the likelihood that parties not involved will rely
on the judgment for preclusion, precedent, or how the decision will influence
public behavior. Third parties also assess the likelihood that similar disputes will
arise again, whether the issue is one of first impression, and the likelihood that
other similar disputes will get to the court.1 80 Certain types of cases raise
important third party concerns, such as constitutional cases, cases enforcing
government regulations, 1 81 and other cases of obvious public concern-such as
those involving environmental pollution. Characterizing private disputes as ones
which are likely to affect third parties is more difficult. What may appear as a
purely private contract dispute may actually have wide implications if the contract
at issue is used by a company across the country.1 8 2 These third party interests
would weigh against vacatur. Other third party interests favoring settlement may
include the interests of children in a divorce proceeding or the interest of disabled
adults in a dispute between group home operators and home owners.
The judgment and the strength of the legal reasoning will also influence the
likelihood that future parties will rely on the judgment if not vacated, and whether
vacatur is an efficient way to deal with the situation. Poorly reasoned decisions
pose fewer problems for vacatur than well-reasoned judgments settling disputed
issues of law. The more important the decision is to the legal community and the
better reasoned the decision is should weigh against vacating. A poorly reasoned
decision, or one unlikely to affect anyone beyond the parties to the suit, should
weigh in favor of vacatur at the parties' request.
While often these types of questions are best answered in hindsight, the
district court is best equipped to answer them as they arise because of its contact
with the parties and its experience with cases before the court. The district court's
decision regarding vacatur, based on the above factors, should be reversed only
for an abuse of discretion. As these standards are used by the district courts and
reviewed by the appellate courts they will become better defined.
While a case by case analysis will not make the mediator's job easy, the
appellate level mediator, like the district court, will be able to analyze the
individual factors to determine what type of cases are appropriate for suggesting
vacatur as a part of settlement. Since the mediator will have a more informal
relationship with the parties, she will have more knowledge of the underlying
reasons for a party's interest in vacatur as well as the importance of the condition
of vacatur to the parties. By having some guidelines for when vacatur will be
granted, the mediator will be able to determine when it is appropriate to suggest,
encourage or discourage requesting vacatur, rather than avoiding it in all cases.

180. National Union, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96 ("Furthermore, appellate review may continue to
be thwarted by the settlement of the underlying dispute, as occurred here.").
181. Raising interests of third parties who may later want to rely on the case as well as third
parties for whom the government regulations are intended to protect.
182. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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When the mediator or a party suggests vacatur as a part of settlement, the
mediator will need to inform the parties that granting or denying such a motion
lies in the discretion of the court.
The mediator's role to facilitate settlement can be enhanced if he has an
additional alternative for helping the parties agree to a settlement in cases where
one party is concerned with the lower court's judgment. The mediator will also
be helped by court opinions analyzing requests for vacatur on a consistent basis
in cases where the parties suggest vacatur and the mediator believes it would not
be granted by the court. Being careful not to cross the line of giving legal advice,
the mediator would want to caution the parties that the request may be denied.
Particularly in cases where the parties are represented by counsel, having available
court decisions analyzing requests for vacatur on consistent factors will help
parties and mediators come to appropriate solutions acceptable to the court.
V. CONCLUSION
As the use of appellate level mediation and settlement programs expands,
settlements requesting vacatur of lower court judgments can be expected to
increase. These settlements can raise serious public policy concerns for the court
and the mediator, depending on the importance of the public and private interests
in the particular case. The courts' response to such motions range from vacating
at the request of the parties to promote settlement, 183 to indicating a refusal 184
to
ever grant such motions because of the public nature of a judgment.
Whether the court grants or denies a motion to vacate resulting from settlement
depends largely on the particular court in which the request is made.
Motions to vacate are properly considered by the district court, appealable to
the appellate court as a matter of right under an abuse of discretion standard of
review. 185 Vacatur may be an appropriate part of a settlement agreement in
some cases and not acceptable in others. This Comment advocates that courts use
a balancing approach to determine when to grant or deny such motions, taking into
consideration the various interests affected by vacatur. The factors to be
considered can be broken into four categories: (1) the interests of the parties in
control of litigation and costs, (2) the interests of the courts in an orderly and
efficient judicial system, (3) the interests of third parties affected by the vacatur,
and (4) the interests of the general public arising from the judgment and the
strength of the legal reasoning. Based on an examination of these factors, vacatur
may be appropriate in some cases-particularly where settlement offers the parties
a better solution than litigation or in cases unlikely to affect third parties; and not
appropriate in other cases-involving judgments likely to be relied on by third
parties because of the importan legal principles developed in a well-reasoned
decision or the nature of the case.

183. Ringsby, 686 F.2d 720.
184. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d. 1299.
185. by
See
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6-26 andSchool
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Mediators can take into consideration the same factors in deciding what
approaches to consider during mediation. As district courts apply this balancing,
the importance of the various interests will become better defined and those
involved in settlement negotiations will be better able to structure appropriate
settlements. Consistency in the analysis used by courts will help mediators in
appellate level mediation programs know whether to suggest, encourage or
discourage settlement conditioned on vacatur depending on factors involved in
individual cases.
ELZABETH L. ANSTAFr"

J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 1991.
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